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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #3791-79/1

19 July 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence  
THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Intelligence  
National Intelligence Officer for Warning  
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa  
SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information.

2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on 17 July with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misrepresented, or if they have significant additional concerns, I will report further to you.



William Parmenter

Attachment  
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19 July 1979

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NFAC #3791-79

19 July 1979

## WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\* No. 9

USSR, CUBA, ET AL.

Analysts see Soviet and Cuban policy toward African problems as basically unchanging over the next few months, without any particular new shift or more active phase following on the Havana Non-Aligned meeting in September. They noted a report that a ZANU official intends to travel to the USSR, as well as to Eastern and Western Europe, looking for fresh arms supplies. If this trip materializes as billed, it would be the first time the Soviets have received a ZANU emissary in Moscow for this purpose. The way may have been paved by a ZAPU/ZANU communique last week announcing agreement on very modest cooperation in the guerrillas' military operations. The Soviets and Cubans have been pressing the unity idea, both as a good thing in itself and as a step toward formation of a provisional Patriotic Front government for Zimbabwe.

While Soviet analysts doubt that the USSR has any special interest in stirring up the Djibouti problem at this time, African analysts are concerned that subversive activity there may be intended in some way to signal Ethiopian (and in this sense Soviet, too) reaction against the increased use of Djibouti by the US as well as Ethiopia's dissatisfaction with the way local politics in the country have evolved.

SOUTH AFRICA

The NIO indicated he had been surprised by reporting on the extent of violent incidents in some areas of South Africa. Analysts are not aware of any particular events -- anniversaries of previous incidents, for example -- which might trigger fresh outbursts in the next two or three months, but it was agreed that we would begin a review of reporting to see if any trends were visible. Analysts suggest that the government may have adopted a policy of giving greater publicity to incidents as part of its strategy of making the white population more alert to potential dangers.

*\* This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously many of these developments will not occur in the time-frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.*

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NAMIBIA

New diplomatic initiatives may lead the South African government to slip its schedule for an "internal settlement" in Namibia, but analysts are skeptical that South African policy on this will turn around. INR suggests there is a possibility of more or less independent action by the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (the South Africans' chosen instrument) to move to independence without the South Africans' formal blessing. Right-wing, pro-apartheid agitation has been developing, and this puts more pressure on for action, possibly in the next couple months.

RHODESIA

Analysts are particularly interested in how the relationships between Kaunda (for the Zambian government) and ZAPU and SWAPO work out following the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka, 1-8 August. Kaunda has moved to place military operations of both organizations under tighter control during the preparatory period, and there is some suspicion that he will try to maintain these controls after the conference. If so, there are likely to be fresh frictions between the Zambians and the two liberation movements.

ZAIRE

Analysts feel more optimistic about the situation in Zaire than they have generally for the past two years (cross fingers here). This is attributable in large part to the willingness of the French and Belgians to play a closer support role in training FAZ units sent to Shaba. Analysts also note that Mobutu and his circle seem to be taking warnings to shape up more seriously than they have in the past, although the proof of this particular pudding is still some time away. What reports we have on FLNC activity in Angola and Zaire indicate that the ex-Katangans are lying low, although they still aspire to return to Shaba at some point.

UGANDA

The situation in Kampala is still very worrisome; analysts fear the new government may not fare much better than the previous leadership, and they note that the ethnic difference between the military wing of the anti-Amin movement and the civilian leaders is still a major irritation. The USSR is resuming operations of its embassy, and, looking farther ahead, there is a potential for the Soviets to resume a military supply relationship.

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SUDAN

There has been no basic improvement in President Nimeiry's situation, in the analysts' view. DIA in particular feels he is surviving, but that's about all, and there is doubt that Sudan's tactical improvement of relations with Libya means very much. We remain concerned that Nimeiry's regime is running out of gas, figuratively if not literally at this point.

HORN OF AFRICA

The Ethiopian revolution remains troubled on several fronts, and we expect more internal turbulence over the coming weeks as Mengistu moves to collectivize agriculture and possibly (again!) form a single official party along Communist lines. The new Eritrean campaign may not be very decisive, although Nacfa may well be taken by the Ethiopian army, and casualties are likely to be high. As in previous campaigns, analysts note a "deeper" level of Soviet/Cuban involvement in supporting the Ethiopian forces, both in Eritrea and in the Ogaden. Moscow has made what, for the African scene, is a very major commitment, and is still basically "defending the revolution" against its enemies, foreign and domestic. We have no new views on Dahlak Island and the Soviet facilities there; activity certainly continues.

WEST AFRICA

CIA analysts are worried about Nigerian oil policy, both in terms of possible political discrimination against the UK and US and a cut back in production; they believe this will bear close watching. The Nigerian domestic political scene is cause for mild optimism, however, as the politicians are acting relatively sensibly and the military is keeping a steady course toward civilian rule, learning more as it goes.

In Mauritania, we believe black opposition to the war with the Polisario will grow, especially if incidents persist in which black enlisted men are killed to support a "white" policy. We foresee no improvement in Chad; we remain very nervous about Ghana, although so far we see no obvious moves by the Soviets to take advantage of the situation there.

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